

# SNF/HLW Dual and Multi Purpose Casks Issues



## Bernhard Droste



BAM Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing  
Berlin, Germany [bernhard.droste@bam.de](mailto:bernhard.droste@bam.de)

BAM/Sandia Workshop  
Albuquerque, NM, USA, October 6-8, 2014


- Design, Transport, Storage of DPCs for SNF and HLW in Germany
- Measurement and Demonstration Programs
- Integrated DPC Safety Case Approach, IAEA
- Aging Considerations
- Inspections before Transport after Storage
- MPC

## SNF/HLW Interim Storage Facilities using Dual Purpose casks


(as constructed, built and operated in  
Germany)



Dual Purpose Cask for  
**S**pent **N**uclear **F**uel (SNF)  
CASTOR V/19  
Transport Version



Dual Purpose Cask for  
**H**igh **L**evel **W**aste (HLW)  
CASTOR HAW28M  
Storage Version



Photos: GNS





Transport of 11 TN85 Casks by Road from La Hague to Valognes, by Rail to Dannenberg and by Road to Interim Storage Facility Gorleben (2008)



Fotos: NCS



**Current Inventory:**


- 108 HLW Casks (1 TS 28V, 74 CASTOR HAW 20/28CG, 12 TN 85, 21 CASTOR HAW28M)
- 5 SNF Casks (1 CASTOR Ic, 1 CASTOR IIa, 3 CASTOR V/19)

Foto: GNS



## German Dry Spent Fuel Storage Demonstration & Measurement Programs with different SNF Dual Purpose Cask Designs:

- CASTOR Ib with 4 PWR SNF Assemblies, NPP Stade-WAK Karlsruhe
- CASTOR Ia with 4 PWR SNF Assemblies, NPP Biblis-KFA Juelich
- TN 1300 with 12 PWR SNF Assemblies, NPP Biblis
- CASTOR Ic with 16 BWR SNF Assemblies, NPP Würgassen
- CASTOR AVR with 2 Stainless Steel Canisters, each filled with 950 spherical „Graphite Ball“ AVR Fuel Elements, KFA Jülich
- TN AVR-2 with the same Contents as before, KFA Jülich



### Results:

Verification of

- Cask handling operations
- Containment function
- Leakage rates and their measurement methods
- Evacuation, drying and gas filling operations
- Shielding efficiency
- Heat removal
- Fuel rod temperatures
- Fuel rod integrity ; cavity gas sampling

**CASTOR Ia with 4 PWR  
SNF Assemblies**

09/1983 – 09/1985



Loading at NPP Biblis




Transport and Transfer into  
a Hall at KFA Juelich

For transportation with a primary lid penetrated by instrumentation orifices the secondary lid needs to be assessed and approved as transport package containment boundary

...that is the same requirement as for storage casks to have a back-up solution in case of a hypothetical loss of primary lid's leaktightness







# Differences between DPC Transport Package and DPC Storage Cask



....to be considered in their Safety Cases

## DPC Transport Package:

- Impact limiters at bottom and lid side, in some designs also circumferentially
- Transport in horizontal position, under canopy
- Acceptance criteria: SSR-6 (e.g. accident test conditions: 9m drop/1m puncture/30 min fire)



## DPC Storage Package:

- No impact limiters (on the cask)
- Secondary lid/seal with monitoring
- Protection lid
- Vertical position, inside hall
- Acceptance criteria: national storage req. (e.g. on-site transport and handling accidents)



**2 Dual Purpose Cask configurations:**  
Different acceptance criteria lead to different DPC specifications which have ONE „core assembly“ (contents, basket, body, primary lid)

## *Preparation of a Safety Case for a Dual Purpose Cask for Storage and Transport of Spent Fuel*

Draft report of WASSC/TRANSSC joint working group  
2011-2013



**IAEA**  
International Atomic Energy Agency

Draft for IAEA internal review (12 Mar. 2014)



**Dual Purpose Casks for Spent Nuclear Fuel**

Joint Working Group on Guidance for an Integrated Transport and Storage Safety Case for Dual Purpose Casks for Spent Nuclear Fuel

**Background**

Spent nuclear fuel which is generated in the operation of nuclear reactors needs to be safely managed following its removal from the reactor core. Reactor storage pools were designed on the assumption that after a short period of time spent nuclear fuel would be removed for reprocessing, disposal or storage elsewhere. Owing to delays in making decisions on the disposition of spent fuel and in putting decisions into effect, the volume of highly radioactive spent fuel that needs to be stored is growing, and additional storage capacity is required.

In June 2010, the IAEA hosted the *International Conference on Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors*. At this conference, strategies were discussed, as well as the framework for the safety of spent fuel

**Resources**

- Safety of Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management
- International Conference on Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors in June 2010

**Page links**

- Objectives
- Working methods and activities
- Third and final meeting

[WG webpage](http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/waste-safety/spent-fuel-casks-wg.asp?s=3)

<http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/waste-safety/spent-fuel-casks-wg.asp?s=3>



***Design considerations to limit ageing effects (e.g. proper material/component selection) and operational conditions to limit access of damaging agents (e.g. drying/evacuation, humidity control) are important issues of safety assessment, package design and management system approval.***

Component Material	Material	Degradation factors	Design consideration
Neutron shielding	Resin, polyethylene	Thermal, radiation	Establishment of weight loss rate of neutron shield material in shielding analysis.
Basket	Aluminum alloy, boron-aluminum alloy; neutron absorbers	Thermal, radiation	Establishment of allowable stress, considering ageing deterioration in structural and compositional analysis for criticality control.
Metal gasket	Aluminum, silver	Chemical, thermal	Moisture control and establishment of temperature limit of the metal gasket.
Elastomeric O-ring	EPDM, FKM	Chemical, radiation, thermal	Material selection
Cask body	Coating	Chemical	Inspection and necessary maintenance
Trunnions	Polymer sealants	Chemical	Inspection and necessary maintenance


**For those components inside the cask and inside the lid closure system, which cannot be changed during the use, it is essential to capture all potential degradation influences at the initial assessment!**

**From IAEA-TECDOC-DRAFT  
“Preparation of a safety case  
for a dual purpose cask  
containing spent fuel”**



Can Cesium,  
released from  
defective fuel  
rods, cause  
corrosion of  
metal seals?


Cs corrosion tests of the lid closures of  
9 small heated containers



Cs corrosion test of Aluminum  
and Silicon specimen



BAM investigations  
could demonstrate  
that it is not the case!  
(1989-1992)



## **CASTOR<sup>®</sup> THTR/AVR**

Interim Storage of SNF of decommissioned gas cooled high temperature research reactor in Jülich, Germany

- ✓ Loaded between 1993 - 2009
- ✓ Monolithic ductile cast iron cask body
- ✓ Double lid closure system  
(permanent pressure monitoring)
- ✓ Metallic seals
- ✓ Upper & lower pair of trunnions
- ✓ Bottom & top impact limiters  
(steel sheeted, wood filled)
- ✓ 20 years in storage



© FZJ



## CASTOR® THTR/AVR




**Transport preparation of  
152 casks is ongoing**



© FZJ

Preparation for transportation  
to another destination

Example:  
Leak-Tightness Test  
at Primary Lid



Example:  
Repair & Testing  
of Trunnions



© FZJ

- (1) Check of documentation of pressure monitoring system** ✓
- (2) Visual check of surfaces** ✓
- (3) Block-Position measurement of all lids** ✓
- (4) Examination of bolting torque of primary lid bolts** ✓
- (5) Leak-tightness tests of lid systems ( 33 primary lids)** ✓
- (6) All seals of 55 reassembled secondary lids renewed and leak-tight tested** ✓
- (7) Inspections of bolts and threaded holes (one hole repaired)** ✓
- (8) Check of trunnions, refurbished and replaced, 55 casks load tested** ✓

**CASTOR<sup>®</sup> THTR/AVR fulfills** current regulatory requirements


55 packages were inspected and tested

**Transport ability was retained after more than 20 years of storage !**

# **Essentials for ageing management of dual purpose transport packages:**

- 1. Design that considers ageing resistance of components and materials**  
(materials ageing assessment, effective inner and outer coatings and medium penetration barriers, quality in manufacturing/documentation etc.)
- 2. Operational conditions that prevent degradation propagation and ingress of corrosive agents as much as possible**  
(drying, evacuation, inert gas atmosphere etc.)
- 3. Periodic package design approval certificate renewal**  
(gap analysis of the safety case, management system adaption etc.)
- 4. Inspection program for tests before transport**  
(appropriate selection of measures considering storage experiences etc.)





**POLLUX Cask (GNS)**  
Designed for transport, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel